Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child? by Foster, Henry H., Jr.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 22 Number 1 Article 2 
10-1-1972 
Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child? 
Henry H. Foster Jr. 
New York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry H. Foster Jr., Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1972). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol22/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
ADOPTION AND CHILD CUSTODY: BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD?*
HENRY H. FOSTER, JR.t
INTRODUcTION
And the king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a sword before
the king. And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and give
half to the one, and half to the other. Then spake the woman whose
the living child was unto the king, for her bowels yearned upon her
son, and she said, 0 my lord, give her the living child and in no wise
slay it. But the other said, let it be neither mine nor thine, but divide
it. Then the king answered and said, Give her the living child, and in
no vise slay it: she is the mother thereof. And all Israel heard of the
judgment which the king had judged; and they feared for the king:
for they saw that the wisdom of God was in him, to do judgment.
I Kings 3:23-28.
The Biblical story of the wisdom of Solomon and the applied psy-
chology by which he resolved a disputed custody case has served
as a most uncertain precedent. Every judge confronted with such a
problem fervently desires to follow that tradition and to make a wise
decision.' Moreover, he tends to rely upon his emotions and his hunches
as to behavior and human relationships. In the individual case, no
matter what the result, reasons for the decision are expressed in terms
of the child's best interests.
Thus the proverbial wisdom of Solomon was based upon the
judge's own psychological sensitivity and it also sowed the seeds of
superstition, for implicit in Solomon's ruse was the assumption that
mother love was of a different dimension and that "blood is thicker
than water." It is this shibboleth, and related slogans, which encourage
lesser judges to avoid the hard task of weighing and balancing relevant
facts in the determination of complicated custody matters. The prob-
* Some of the substance of this article appeared as a paper delivered before the
annual meeting of the American Academy of Pediatrics on October 19, 1971.
,t Professor of Law, New York University. Member, New York, Pennsylvania, &
Nebraska Bars. A.B., University of Nebraska, 1933; LL.B., 1936; LL.M., Harvard Uni-
versity, 1941; LL.M., University of Chicago, 1960. Co-author of H. FoSTER & D. FREED,
LAW AND THE FAMmY-NEw YORK (rev. ed. 1972) and M. PLOSCOWE, H. FOSTER &
D. FREED, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAmILY LAw (rev. ed. 1972).
1.. "A judge agonizes more about reaching the right result in a contested custody
issue than about any other type of decision he renders." B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273
(1952).
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lem is aggravated because the controlling principle of a child's best
interests is an amorphous concept which may serve as a basis for ra-
tionalization of any result and because of an unfortunate judicial-and
human-tendency to stereotype relationships. The concept applies,
and rationalization occurs, in both custody cases and where there is an
attempted revocation of consent to adoption.
Before the last century Anglo-American law had no difficulty in
resolving parental disputes as to custody. The father had a property
interest in his children; their mother had none.2 The paterfamilias
owned or managed all the family property, he had an uncertain re-
ciprocal duty to support, and the mother was a legal nonentity. It is
rather amusing that it was not until the moral activism which cul-
minated in the Victorian era that a father lost a custody dispute. The
honor of first loser went to the poet Percy Shelley whose romantic
adventures and religious heresy provoked the court to punitive retalia-
tion.3 It was not poetic justice. Lest this be viewed as chauvinistic, it
should further be noted that Mary Besant, a few years later, also was
barred from custody because she had been active in the dissemination
of birth control information. 4 Thus was established the doctrine that
immoral or unfit parents should be punished by depriving them of
custody or visitation rights to their children.5 It was not until after the
1920's that a wife divorced for adultery had any standing to be con-
sidered as legal custodian of her children.
In other connections, it has been said that generalizations or ab-
stractions do not form the basis for deciding concrete cases.0 In custody
disputes, however, such all too frequently is the case. There appear to
be at least three major reasons for this phenomenon. First, a "rule of
thumb" complex is evident in such cases. Second, fact finding and
adjudication is a painful process. And third, judges generally do not
have and are not given relevant psychological insights which would aid
decision.
The "rules of thumb": (1) parental fitness, and (2) best interests
2. For examples of the strong preference for the father over the mother, tee Ex
parte Skinner, 9 Moore 278, 27 Rev. R. 710 (C.P. 1824); Rex v. Greenhill, 111 Eng.
Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836).
3. See Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817).
4. See In re Besant, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 508.
5. See Simpson, The Unfit Parent, 39 U. DET. L.J. 347 (1962).
6. "A generalization is empty so far as it is general. Its value depends on the number
of particulars which it calls up to the speaker and the hearer." Holmes, Law in Science
and Science in Law, 12 HAv. L. REv. 461 (1899).
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of the child, constitute the black letter law of custody. Usually it is
said that the consideration of parental fitness determines a contest
between a natural parent and a "stranger," the latter being any non-
parent. The best interests of the child is said to control parental dis-
putes over custody and visitation.7 The generalizations are misleading
and it is necessary to explore the actual workings of these rules of
thumb.
We have said that fact finding and adjudication in custody mat-
ters is a painful process for a court. In part this is so because there is
involved not only a decision as to past conduct but a prediction as to
the future. It would be far more simple if all the court had to do was
to award money damages. But how does a judge know for sure what
actually will serve the best interests of a child? Unless the issue is
broken up into more specific and concrete elements stressing the child's
psychological welfare,8 the clich6 is meaningless. The temptation is
great for overburdened courts to resort to secondary rules of thumb
such as "a natural parent is to be preferred over a stranger," "a mother
is to be preferred over a father," and that "the non-custodial parent
should be given liberal visitation rights." Each of these generalizations
may further the best interests of children in many if not most cases
but none of them should be inflexible or automatic. Moreover, in
practice they often are utilized to avoid hard work.
If courts are to do a better job in custody matters it is essential
that such cases be referred to judges who have some knowledge of be-
havioral science and who are receptive to expert testimony and the
recommendations of specialists. In this connection, it is tragic that the
literature of psychiatry and psychology has relatively little to offer as
a direct aid to a specific decision. 9 Furthermore, the clinicians and
practitioners usually have avoided forensic issues.
In the discussion that follows we will concentrate on two highly
publicized cases-both wrongly decided-and each of which has been
reversed by subsequent events or legislation. In the Iowa custody case,
7. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pts. 1-2), 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 423, 615 (1964).
8. See Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following
Divorce, 21 SYvscusE L. REv. 55 (1969); Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study of Vague
and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAMmY LAw 21 (1965); Note, Alternatives to "Parental
Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Alternatives].
9. The difficulty is that psychiatric or psychological comment generally is not
directed specifically at the issue before the court and there is a paucity of helpful material
directly in point.
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young Mark did ultimately rejoin his father; in the New York case,
the drastic remedy of self-help worked in Florida and the New York
legislature changed the rules and rationale of revocation of consent to
adoption. 10
IOWA GOTHIC
Grant Wood's memorable portrait, "Iowa Gothic," seems to
epitomize the Iowa court's holding in Painter v. Bannister."' There,
as may be recalled, the court decided that four year old Mark's wel-
fare would be better served by remaining on a farm with elderly
maternal grandparents than by returning him to his father and new
step-mother who were living in what was described as the "Bohemian
atmosphere" of the San Francisco Bay Area. The decision occasioned
an uproar and a wave of indignation, but attempts to raise a federal
issue were unsuccessful. 12 What was wrong with the decision?
It is evident that there were a number of errors. Most important,
the court had no cause to get into an invidious comparison of rural
Iowa and the Bay Area. Mark, following the tragic death of his mother
and baby sister in a car accident, was placed temporarily by the dis-
traught father with the maternal grandparents on the understanding
that he would be returned when the father re-established a home.
There was no relinquishment nor abandonment by the father. Under
these Circumstances, to award legal custody to the grandparents was
the equivalent of taking a child from a poor home in order to place
him with a more affluent couple who could give him greater material
advantages. There was no basis for the operation of the so-called best
interests rule. Before that rule comes into play some event or behavior
must have terminated the parental right to custody.
There is bitter irony in the fact that the Iowa court in Painter
blindly applied the so-called best interests rule and ignored the parental
interest of the father. Usually, it is the parental rights doctrine that is
applied inflexibly and without regard to the psychological conse-
quences to the child. Raymond v. Cotner,3 is a far more typical illustra-
10. N.Y. Dom. R.EL. LAw § 115-b (McKinney Supp. 1972).
11. 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
See also, H. PAINTER, MARX, I LovE You (1967).
12. H. PAINTER, sup ra note 11, at 199.
13. 175 Neb. 158, 120 N.W.2d 892 (1963). According to Raymond, even an indif-
ferent father had exclusive right to custody of a daughter versus maternal grandparents
who had raised the child for ten years, unless the father's unfitness was affirnatively
established.
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tion, of errors in judicial judgment and the preference for natural
parents which usually exists. The point, of course, is that no test
should be applied exclusively or inexorably, but at most should merely
serve as a guideline in weighing and balancing all relevant considera-
tions. Later Iowa decisions indicate that this point has been grasped and
that a Procrustean technique has been abandoned. 14
Painter may also involve a problem of misapplied psychology. At
the trial the expert testimony of a competent child psychologist was
introduced in behalf of the grandparents. He was the only expert wit-
ness. The transcript shows that he was permitted to ramble without
interruption or objection and that there was no meaningful' cross-
examination. Admittedly, he had not seen the father. A great deal of
the testimony was the grossest kind of speculation and many of the
conclusions arrived at were questionable or controversial from the view-
point of child psychology. For example, the expert witness concluded
that it would be harmful to Mark to take him away from his grand-
parents, even though he also testified that Mark had shown capacity
to adjust to changes in custody. It would be logical to say that in this
case the fears expressed by the psychologist were not consistent with
Mark's past record of adaptability. This writer subsequently appeared
on a law school program with the child psychologist who testified for
the grandparents. The psychologist admitted that he "got carried
away," that he relied solely on a couple of interviews with Mark and
what the grandparents had told him, and that a full scale investiga-
tion might have proved him wrong.15
Thus we see that although there is an urgent need for competent
expert testimony in child custody cases it also is essential that there be
a balanced presentation of opinion and that conclusions be subjected
to the search of incisive cross-examination. The psychological well-
being of the child should be the goal; there should be concern over his
"affection-relationship" and his personality development; but the ulti-
mate decision must be that of a court which insists on compiling all the
facts, psychological and otherwise.'"
14. See Alingh v. Alingh, 259 Iowa 219, 144 N.W.2d 134 (1966), and Halstead v.
Halstead, 259 Iowa 526, 144 N.W.2d 861 (1966), both of which correctly applied the
best interests test since in each case grandparents had de facto custody for ten years
and there was parental misconduct or neglect.
15. A panel discussion of Painter v. Bannister was held at the Rutgers Law School
in 1967, and there was extended discussion of the expert testimony in the case.
16. See Alternatives.
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A recent custody battle in England and France raises some of
the issues that have become familiar in the United States.17 On Decem-
ber 7, 1970, an English magistrates court, presided over by 66-year-old
Mrs. Peile, a lay judge, awarded the custody of a baby girl to the
estranged father. The father, a Frenchman, was separated from his
English wife after seven months of marriage and before the birth of
the child. Mrs. Peile explained the decision on the basis that the
magistrates had felt that the nineteen year old mother was very young
and inexperienced and that she had not sustained her allegations that
the husband had been guilty of cruelty. Moreover, it was concluded
that the daughter would be "happier as a French child and a Catholic
in France with her father." Admittedly, the child's religion was an
important point in the decision.
The magistrate's decision was reversed by the British Appeal Court
in February 1971, and custody was given to the mother. In May 1971,
the Versailles county court ruled that the child should spend alterna-
tive periods of three months with each parent, but was reversed by the
Paris appeal court in July when custody was given to the French
paternal grandmother. In March 1972, the father took the child away
from the grandmother, the grandmother secured an injunction against
him, but in June a children's court "provisionally" gave him custody.
On July 4, the Versailles court gave custody to the mother, and was
sustained upon appeal later that month. The baby, Caroline Desramault,
was nine months old when the case came to court for the first time in
England. She was two and a half at the time of the last French decision.
In the interim, the case had been heard by eight courts, and most of
the trial court decisions were reversed upon appeal. As of mid-August
1972, the father still had the child and was rumored to be in Belgium
where he could avoid French process.
The major blame for this tragedy of errors must be attributed to
the lay magistrates. As in Painter, there is irony. The magistrates did
overcome the usual blind prejudice for the mother, but did so in the
wrong fact situation. She was not shown to be unfit-they merely "felt"
that she was young and inexperienced, took away her baby, and gave
it to a father who saw it for the first time during the trial. There was
no psychological evidence in the case. One suspects that the religious
17. The case involving Caroline Desramault was extensively reported in English
and French periodicals during 1972. See especially the editorial in The Guardian of
August 10, 1972, and the account in The Times (London), July 29, 1972, at
2, col. 5, regarding reasons given for the magistrate's decision.
6
ADOPTION AND CHILD CUSTODY
training problem was not merely a factor but the overriding considera-
tion in the case, effecting an unnatural result.' s
THE BABY LENORE CASE
"Baby Lenore" was born in Manhattan on May 18, 1970. Her
mother was a 32 year old Colombian native who had graduated from
college in the United States.' 9 She returned to this country after having
an affair with a married man in Colombia and on January 14, 1970
contacted a reputable New York adoption agency, saying that when her
baby was born, she wanted to place it for adoption. The agency had
some fourteen counselling interviews with the mother between Jan-
uary and the date of birth in May. Six or more alternative plans were
proposed, including temporary boarding care after birth until the
mother made up her mind about placement. Throughout all these
interviews, the mother steadfastly insisted that she wanted to place the
child for adoption and rejected all other alternatives. She did not see
the baby after it was born; it was placed in nursery care. On June 1,
1970, the mother, accompanied by a sister, signed and executed a
formal surrender to the agency for placement of the child in an adop-
tive home. The surrender was signed, sealed, and acknowledged by two
witnesses. At the time the mother had around $20,000 in the bank.
"Baby Lenore" was placed with the Di Martino family on June
18, 1970, when she was just a month old. The adoptive parents already
had an adopted daughter who was about four years older than "Baby
Lenore" and the family had been thoroughly investigated for adop-
tion before both placements. Mr. Di Martino was a lawyer who special-
ized in the adjustment of accident cases for insurance companies, and
Mrs. Di Martino was an exceptionally bright and active young woman.
On June 29, 1970, the natural mother called the agency and said
that "she felt unhappy and unfulfilled." There is a dispute as to
whether or not she asked for the return of her baby at this time. The
18. Compare the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Dickens v. Ernesto,
30 N.Y.2d 61, 281 N.E.2d 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1972).
19. The facts recited appear in the transcript of the New York case or were presented
at the Florida habeas corpus hearing. The writer was of counsel in the Florida proceeding
on behalf of the Di Martino family. The Florida decision is unreported, but for the New
York decision, see People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d
185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971). For criticisms of the decision, see Foster,
Revocation of Consent to Adoption: A Covenant Running With the Child?, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 6, 1971, at 1, cols. 4-5; Katz, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Problems of Consent
and the Role of Lawyers, 5 FAmmry L.Q. 405 (1971); Inker, Expanding the Rights of
Children in Custody and Adoption Cases, id. at 417.
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agency recommended a psychiatrist who was consulted by the mother.
The agency said nothing to the Di Martino family, even after the
mother commenced a habeas corpus action in September 1970 to re-
claim her child from the agency. It was not until early November 1970
that Mr. Di Martino learned of the litigation and he did not tell Mrs.
Di Martino until the last week in November.
The Di Martino family sought to intervene in the habeas corpus
proceeding but, due to procedural technicalities, were not permitted
to do so. They were not even called as witnesses. The litigation de-
generated into a contest of slogans and presumptions. The agency
asserted that the mother was bound by her contract. The mother
claimed that she had a natural right to her child-at least until an
adoption order was entered-and that she was merely exercising her
female prerogative to change her mind. The mother prevailed, and
in May 1971 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed both the decision
to return "Baby Lenore" to her natural mother and the refusal to per-
mit the Di Martinos to intervene in the proceedings.
20
In April 1971, before the Court of Appeals decision, Mrs. Di
Martino moved to Florida with the two children and was later joined
by Mr. Di Martino. When the decision was handed down, the Di Mar-
tinos claimed a Florida residency. They were never served with any
papers or orders in the State of New York or elsewhere. Nonetheless,
they were adjudged in contempt.
In June 1971, the natural mother brought a habeas corpus action
in Florida seeking the return of "Baby Lenore." Her attorneys argued
that full faith and credit had to be given to the New York decision and
that the Di Martinos in effect were "outlaws." Counsel for the Di Mar-
tinos argued that since they were not parties to the New York litigation
and had not been permitted to intervene they were not bound by that
decision and that in any event the sole issue for the Florida court was
the best interests of "Baby Lenore." The trial proceeded accordingly.
The natural mother produced no witnesses nor evidence that the
child's welfare would be best served by its return to her. The Di Mar-
tinos, on the other hand, produced a series of expert and character
witnesses. The New York and Miami pediatricians who had cared for
"Baby Lenore" were important witnesses and testified how she had
grown and improved while with the Di Martinos. Dr. Stella Chess, a
20. People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269
N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971).
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leading medical authority on child development, testified as to the pos-
sible trauma removal might precipitate to a thirteen month old child.2 1
Dr. Andrew Watson,22 and others, gave similar testimony. On the basis
of this medical proof, the Florida trial court decided that the baby
should remain with the Di Martino family; its decision was affirmed
in September 1971.23
Note that both the New York and Florida courts purported to
apply the best interests test and said that it controlled. However, since
the New York courts had no evidence or testimony about what would
actually serve the welfare of "Baby Lenore" the void was filled by pre-
sumptions. It was asserted that unless parental unfitness was affirmatively
established, it would be presumed that a child's welfare would best be
served by placing it with a parent. By this legerdemain, parental unfit-
ness rather than an inquiry into best interests, became the real issue.
Florida, on the other hand, did not engage in any presumptions but
made a full scale inquiry into the facts bearing on "Baby Lenore's"
welfare.
There also was disagreement between New York and Florida as
to the extent of the right to revoke a consent to adoption.2 4 New York
purports to follow the majority rule that a court has discretion to
permit such revocation if the best interests of the child would be served
by its return to the natural mother and the revocation occurs before
the adoption order is entered.2 5 Florida, on the other hand, follows
a minority rule that the mother has no right to revoke if she gave
an informed and valid consent to the adoption, i.e., unless there was
fraud or overreaching.20 Both states reject another minority rule which
21. Dr. Chess is the author of the classic AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILD PSYCHIATRY
(2d ed. 1969) and is a leading authority on child development.
22. Dr. Andrew Watson is a psychiatrist on the faculty of both the law and med-
ical schools at the University of Michigan and is the author of PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS
(1968).
23. The Florida cases are unreported but the habeas corpus decision was by the
Circuit Court of Dade County on June 22, 1971.
24. H. CLARK, LAW OF DomEsTic RELATIONS 626-29 (1968); Katz, Judicial and
Statutory Trends in the Law of Adoption, 15 GEo. L.J. 64 (1962); Comment, Revoca-
tion of Consent and Adoption: Legal Doctrine and Social Policy 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 564
(1961). All discuss the state of the law regarding revocation of consent to adoption.
25. People ex. rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185,
269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971). Some 25 or more states are said to follow the
"discretion" rule, which makes revocation subject to the court's discretion in terms of
the best interests of the child. In about 10 states there are no statutes or decisions in point.
26. Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Texas and Washingon have held that a valid consent to
adoption is irrevocable. See Skeen v. Marx, 105 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
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permits revocation for any reason unless a final order of adoption has
been entered.27 Since in custody matters guidelines rather than hard
and fast rules are to be preferred, the majority or New York rule ap-
pears to be the most desirable. It is not to be preferred, however, if the
court does not do its job of inquiring into all the facts and merely in-
dulges in presumptions.
In the "Baby Lenore" case it was a matter of great significance that
there was an agency placement rather than a private placement. The
New York statutes on adoption show a legislative policy of differen-
tiating the two processes and different procedures are set out under
different titles of the law.28 The "Baby Lenore" decision ignores this
legislative policy and lumps together agency and private placements,
saying "[N]or do we perceive any distinction, in principle, between
the effect of surrender to an authorized agency and of a surrender to
an individual."29 It is this error which threatened the integrity of the
adoption process in New York. Agency placements are different from
private placements, in principle, in procedure, in surrounding cir-
cumstances, and in the way the legislature has regarded them.
As a matter of public policy, it may be argued that in the case of
a private placement, greater leeway should be given to a revocation of
consent to adoption. It is in this situation that there is most apt to be
an impetuous or emotional decision to give up the child.8 0 However,
where the child is surrendered to an agency, and as in the "Baby
Lenore" case the natural mother has been given counseling and as-
sistance, the decision is most apt to be an intelligent and rational one.
Agency placements also involve extensive prior investigations of the
27. Michigan is the leading example of this extreme rule. See In re White's
Adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942).
28. Chapter 147 of the 1961 N.Y. Session Laws created two titles for Domestic
Relations Law: Article 7, title II referring to "Adoption from Authorized Agency"
which covered sections 112-14 of the Domestic Relations Law, and title III referring to
"Private Placement Adoptions" which covered sections 115-16 of the Domestic Relations
Law. It is clear that it was intended that the two types of placements should have different
procedures and should be distinguished.
29. 28 N.Y.2d at 193, 269 N.E.2d at 791, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
30. It has been reported that in Los Angeles County there is an attempted revoca-
tion of consent to adoption in less than 1 percent of the agency placements; but the
figure is 13 percent for private placements. See the January 1970 report by the Advisory
Commission to the Department of Adoptions of Los Angeles County in its comment on
the proposed revision of the Uniform Adoption Act of 1968. In the Scarpetta case, a repre-
sentative of the Spence-Chapin Adoption Service testified that less than 1 percent of their
agency placements have involved attempted revocation of surrenders for adoption. Record
at 49.
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adoptive parents, whereas in private placements investigation generally
occur after the baby has been received into the adoptive home.
The New York legislature at its 1972 session overruled the ra-
tionale of the "Baby Lenore" case and its unsupportable refusal to
differentiate agency and private placements.31 In general, it is pro-
vided that natural parents "shall have no right to the custody of such
child superior to that of adoptive parents" even if they are "fit, compe-
tent and able to duly maintain, support and educate the child. The
custody of such a child [surrendered for adoption or placed in an
adoptive home] shall be awarded solely on the basis of the best interests
of the child, and there shall be no presumption [as in the "Baby
Lenore" case] that such interests will be promoted by any particular
custodial disposition."''
Except where there are allegations of fraud, duress or coercion in
the execution or inducement of a surrender for adoption, there are
strict limitations on the commencement of an action to revoke
consent to adoption or to regain the child who was surrendered for
that purpose. If the surrender so states, no such actions may be brought
if the child has been placed in an adoptive home and more than thirty
days have elapsed since the surrender was executed.33
In private placement adoptions, where there was no surrender to
an agency, there also are limitations on any attempted revocation of
consent. If the consent agreement so states, it is not subject to revoca-
tion if it is in prescribed form and executed or acknowledged before
the court where the adoption proceeding is to take place, or even
where not executed or acknowledged in court, written notice of revoca-
tion is not received within thirty days. If the written notice is given,
it may be given effect only if it is unopposed by the adoptive parents or
the best interests of the child would be served by revocation. The
procedure for revocation of consent cases is set forth in the new statute
which confers upon adoptive parents full standing to appear and be
heard. 4
It remains to be seen whether the New York courts will fully im-
plement the philosophy as well as the letter of the amended laws.
Although it may be argued that the amendment gives a natural parent
thirty days from the date of the surrender to change her mind, in
31. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 115-16 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
32. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
33. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 384(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
34. N.Y. DoM. R-L. LAW § 115-b (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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actual practice the agency may deliver the child to the adoptive home
only when such period has expired, so that there is minimal danger
of successful revocation after adoptive parents have formed a bond of
attachment with the child. It is to be hoped that courts do not readily
find fraud or overreaching so as to negate the intent of the new law
and that in resolving the "sole issue" of best interests of the child
courts will be receptive to cogent expert testimony that is relevant to
the proceeding.
Approval of the new amended adoption law is not inconsistent
with our prior criticism of Painter. In the Iowa case there was no act
or event that had the effect of terminating parental rights. Under the
new statute, however, the formal execution of a surrender for place-
ment for adoption or a consent to adoption, is such an event. It is only
after such an event occurs that the best interests rule becomes the "sole
issue." Moreover, the rubric of "best interests" is broad enough to
cover a multitude of factors.
It is to be hoped that when and if a court reaches the best interests
of the child issue in revocation of consent to adoption proceedings the
psychological welfare of the child will be the focal point for inquiry.
Recent decisions in other states indicate an increasing acceptance of
generally recognized theories of child developmentas It has been recog-
nized that the psychological parent-child relationship is more important
than biological parenthood and that true mother love entails the
care and nurture of a child, rather than an empty sentiment.3 6 Ordinar-
ily, the best psychological interests of a child require continuity and
consistency in the parent-child relationship. 7 Removing a child from
35. Compare People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d
185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971), with In re Adoption of a Child by P and
Wife, 114 N.J. Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (1971), and In re Revocation of Appointment
of a Guardian of a Minor Surrendered for Adoption, - Mass. - , 271 N.E.2d 621
(1971).
36. See cases cited id.
37. One authority has recently concluded:
Any psychiatrist or psychologist, experienced parent, grandparent, or teacher
will state that when there has already been an upheaval in the child's life due
to divorce or some other misfortune, the first and foremost requirement for the
child's health and proper growth is stability, security, and continuity. Dr. An-
drew Watson, psychiatrist and professor of law, has said that stability is "prac-
tically the principal element in raising children, especially pre-puberty ones,"
and that "a child can handle almost anything better than he can handle insta-
bility." [Citing PROCEEDINGS OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM DIVORCe
AND MARRIAGE ACT, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws 98, 101 (Dec. 15-16, 1968)]. Furthermore, Dr. Watson maintains
that "poor parental models are easier to adapt to than ever shifting ones." Simi-
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the warmth and security of the place he knows as home should be done
only in the most compelling circumstances. In the case of infants, there
is a real danger of trauma if they are taken from the mother figure.
8
These general principles also apply to adoptions by foster parents and
it is interesting to note in passing that also in that situation there has
been legislative revision of legalistic court decisions so that under present
law foster parents have a preference for adoption and may even be
encouraged to adopt by the granting of a subsidy.39
laxly, Dr. Herbert Modlin of the Menninger Foundation stresses the importance
of "constancy of mothering" and describes the characteristics of children in the
various periods of preadolescent and preadult existence in which their needs
vary somewhat, but there is always the requirement of continuity and a sense
of family, satisfying a need to belong. [Citing READINGS IN LAW AND PSY-
CHIATRY 319-22 (R. Allen, E. Ferster & J. Rubin eds. 1968). See also Plant,
The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 807, 812-14, 816 (1944).]
Bodenheimer, Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1208-09
(1969). Professor Homer Clark has expressed the cruciality of stability in the following
manner:
One of the things that the child's welfare certainly demands is stability and
regularity. If he is continuously being transferred from one parent to the other
by conflicting court decrees, he may be a great deal worse off than if left with
one parent, even though as an original proposition some better provision could
have been made for him.
H. CLARx, LAW OF DoMeESTIC RELATIONS 326 (1968). In Psychiatry for Lawyers, Dr. An-
drew S. Watson has asserted that once custody decisions have been made they "should
nearly always be permanent and irrevocable." A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS
197 (1968).
38. See 1 J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS 223 (1969):
After about six months ... babies are more likely to respond to strange figures
With fear responses, and more likely also to respond to them with strong fear re-
sponses, than they are when they are younger. Because of the growing frequency
and strength of such fear responses, the development of attachment to a new
figure becomes increasingly difficult towards the end of the first year and
subsequently.
Dr. Bowlby makes it clear that he is concerned with the person who mothers the child
and to whom he becomes attached, rather than the biological mother. In S. CHESS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CHILD PSYCHIATRY 16 (1969), Dr. Stella Chess notes her agreement
with Dr. Bowlby and comments that "such workers as Levy, Ribble, Anna Freud, and
Bowlby have assigned prime importance in the child's development to intrafamilial phe-
nomena as manifested during the first year of life." In R. G. PATTON, GROWTH FAILURE
IN MATERNAL DEPRIVATION 38 (1963), Dr. Robert Gray Patton says: "The gravest effects
of separation are seen between the ages of three months and two years and then gradually
decrease in severity until the age of 7 or 8, when the child is able to tolerate long
periods of separation without any lasting major damage to personality structure." For
the most recent study in this field, see R. DAVIE, N. BUTLER & J. GOLDSTEIN, FROM BIRTH
TO SEVEN (1972) (Second Report of the English National Child Development Survey).
39. Following the decision in the case of In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222,
156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959) [criticized by Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agen-
cies: A Case Study in the judicial Application of "The Best Interests of Children" Doc-
trine, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 145 (1966), and by Foster & Freed, Children and the Law, 2
FAMILY L. Q. 40, 54-56 (1968)] the legislature passed chapter 1080 of the 1969 N.Y.
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This discussion of the "Baby Lenore" case would be incomplete
unless brief reference were made to Florida's refusal to give comity or
full faith and credit to the prior New York decision. Child snatching
by parents who lose custody has become a national and international
scandal. 40 The existing law of most jurisdictions encourages the viola-
tion and defiance of court orders. Perhaps it is impossible to completely
eliminate the problem, due to human nature, favoritism for local peo-
ple, and the sad fact that outrageous custody decisions are not infre-
quent. In a few cases, to deny a contumacious parent a modification of
a prior custody award which he has violated might punish the child
to spite the erring parent. Nonetheless, application of the clean hands
doctrine in such cases has much to commend it and certainly courts
should show greater deference to prior decisions, even though full
faith and credit is not required, in order to discourage flight across
state lines or international boundaries. Enactment of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,41 if accomplished in most states, would
provide an effective remedy to the child snatching problem, but to date
this model act has not met with widespread acceptance, perhaps be-
cause unwise custody decisions are known to be common. There are
no indications that the federal courts or Congress intend to deal with
the problem. The final irony, of the several we have pointed to, is that
the two states with the worst records on extending credit or deference
to sister state's custody orders, are Florida and New York. In de-
clining to recognize New York's decree in the "Baby Lenore" case,
Florida violated no ideal principle of reciprocity, for in the famous
Halvey case,43 New York had rejected a prior Florida custody award.
Session Laws, amending section 383 of the N.Y. Social Service Law thus granting a
preference to foster parents in applications for adoption. Thus the policy against allowing
foster parents to adopt was completely reversed.
40. See H. FOSTER & D. FREED, 2 LAW AND THE FAuLy-NEw YORKC, §29:35
(1966), and Bodenheimer, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 22 VAND. L. Rnv.
1207 (1969).
41. See discussion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in Bodenhcimer,
supra note 40.
42. The New York Court of Appeals in Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d
866, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956) rejected any full faith and credit obligation in custody
cases. See also Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371, 235 N.E.2d 109, 288 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968), in which the court of appeals denied full faith and
credit to the decision reported in 239 Md. 52, 210 A.2d 380 (1965). The leading
Florida decisions stipulating a de novo inquiry in modification of custody proceed-
ings include: State ex rel. Fox v. Webster, 151 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Avery v. Heermance, 138 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); Neal v. State ex rel. Neal, 135 So. 2d 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
43. People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
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CONCLUSION
Where the life and welfare of a child is at stake, law, public policy,
procedure, attitudes, and prejudices are all important. A sound sub-
stantive law will provide guidelines but no absolutes, and presump-
tions will not be allowed to serve in lieu of a full scale inquiry into
relevant facts. The goal of public policy should be to promote the wel-
fare of children and claims of parental rights must be subordinated
to that end.44 However, before parental rights may be terminated,
there must be some act or event that constitutes an express or implied
relinquishment of parental authority. Such may be an abandonment,
serious neglect, conduct showing unfitness as a parent, or by a knowing
surrender of the child for adoption. Under such circumstances, the
issue of the best interests of the child should become the controlling
concern.
In addition to substantive law, the fact finding process must be
made to work effectively. It was legalistic in the extreme to deny leave
to intervene to the Di Martino family in the "Baby Lenore" case. They
literally were real parties in interest. But more significant was the fact
that the court cut itself off from a source of relevant testimony on the
issue of the best interests of "Baby Lenore." All too often, custody dis-
putes degenerate into adversary contests between embittered parties
both of whom lose sight of the child's welfare. If we assume that exist-
ing procedure is here to stay, there is only one reform which shows
promise of success. That is independent representation of any child
directly involved in a dispute between his parents.45
It is anomalous that under the procedure which exists in most
states children are unrepresented when parents seek a divorce even
though the issue of their custody may be the major one in the case.
Children should be heard as well as seen and should be regarded as
persons by the law. Their interests may not coincide with those of
either parent and require independent presentation. Counsel for the
father or mother cannot be relied upon to present facts detrimental to
269 App. Div. 1019, 59 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 836, 66 N.E.2d
851 (1946), aff'd, 329 U.S. 697 (197). The day before the entry of a Florida divorce
decree and custody decree, the father fled with the child to New York. Florida awarded the
child to the mother and made no mention of visitation rights for the father. The New
York court awarded the father visitation rights and was sustained by the Supreme Court.
44. See Alternatives.
45. See Speca & Wehrman, Protecting the Rights of Children in Divorce Cases in
Missouri, 38 U.M.K.C. L. Rav. 1 (1969); Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children,
N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1972, at 1, cols. 4-5.
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his client to whom the duty of loyalty is owed. The result is that al-
though the best interests of the child may be the "sole issue," opposing
counsel serve the best interests of their own clients. Moreover, the
court for numerous reasons ordinarily will not try to develop the
child's welfare issue from the child's vantage point. In short, there is
an urgent need to extend the fundamental principle of right to coun-
sel to all cases where the placement of a child is at stake in divorce,
custody, contested adoption, delinquency, and termination of parental
rights proceedings. That right to counsel means independent repre-
sentation of the child by a lawyer who will serve his interests.
It may be objected that courts have no authority to designate coun-
sel to represent children except in delinquency cases. On the contrary,
unless there is a statute or rule of court that forbids such an appoint-
ment, there is inherent power to do so.46 Nor is there any lack of law-
yers to serve in such a capacity. The new breed of young attorneys
constitutes a valuable resource for such service, whether chosen on a
permanent or guardian ad litem basis.
With reference to the practical significance of attitudes and
prejudices, it is clear that unless there is a genuine dedication to fur-
ther the welfare of children, reforms of substantive law and procedures
will go for naught. Today it is rare for courts to speak in terms of pro-
prietary rights in children or even to stress parental rights as such but
not infrequently courts rule as if there was a covenant running with the
child. The shibboleth that "blood is thicker than water" has no place
in a modern court. Hopefully, education may dissipate superstitution
and prejudice, and that may be done in this area by opening up the
admission of medical and psychological proof bearing upon the issue
of a child's welfare.47 If children are truly regarded as persons before
the law and are represented by independent counsel it should follow
that in fact the best interests of the child will become the ultimate issue
in disputed custody cases.
Editorial Note
On Monday, November 13, 1972, the United States Supreme
Court denied a petition for certiorari by the natural mother in the con-
troversial "Baby Lenore" case. As a practical matter, the ruling refuses
to disturb the Florida courts' decision permitting the baby to remain
with the Di Martino family.
46. See authorities cited id.
47. See Foster & Freed, supra note 7.
